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EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF BRAZIL’S BOLSA FAMÍLIA:  
CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMMES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
∗ 
Fabio Veras Soares,
∗∗  Rafael Perez Ribas** and Rafael Guerreiro Osorio** 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Bolsa Família is one of the largest Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes in the world, 
benefiting roughly 11 millions families. It provides a monthly transfer to poor households with 
children up to 15 years of age and/or a pregnant woman, and a monthly transfer to extremely 
poor households regardless of their composition. Although Brazil does not have official 
poverty lines, the programme has set the eligibility threshold at R$ 60 (US$ 33) per capita for 
extremely poor households and at R$120 (US$66) per capita for poor households. 
Only extremely poor households are entitled to the basic benefit of R$ 58 (US$ 32). 
Whether poor or extremely poor, a household can receive R$ 18 (US$ 10) for a pregnant 
woman or for each child up to a maximum of three children. Therefore, the maximum transfer 
for an extremely poor household is R$ 112 (US$ 61) and for a poor household R$ 54 (US$ 30).1  
The programme started in 2004 with the merger of the existing conditional and 
unconditional cash transfer programmes of the Federal Government. It specifically unified four 
major programmes: Bolsa Escola, a minimum income grant related to primary education; Fome 
Zero and Bolsa Alimentação, two income grants related to food security; and Vale Gás, a subsidy 
to help poor households buy cooking gas. Once created, Bolsa Família was scaled up to include 
11 million households by the end of 2006. 
Bolsa Família lacks well-defined objectives since it merged different programmes. But it is 
taken for granted that it aims: i) to alleviate the income deprivation of poor households and  
ii) to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty.  
The first objective is achieved through the income transfer and the second through the 
enforcement of conditionalities regarding education and health. The main conditionalities are: 
i) children 6-15 years old must maintain 85 per cent school attendance; ii) children up to six 
years old must have their immunisation status confirmed and, together with pregnant women, 
must have regular health check-ups. 
A great deal of attention has been focused on Bolsa Família’s implementation and 
targeting methods, its impact on poverty and inequality and its possible unintended negative 
impacts, particularly on labour force participation. In this Evaluation Note, we summarise some 
of the principal findings of recent research undertaken by the International Poverty Centre and 
the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), as well as new evidence from an impact 
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evaluation of the programme undertaken by the Center of Development and Regional 
Planning (Cedeplar) of the Federal University of Minas Gerais. 
2  THE TARGETING OF THE BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
Bolsa Família uses unverified means-testing conducted at the municipal level to select its 
beneficiaries.2 Given the programme’s large size, it would be very costly to use verified means-
testing or proxy means-testing to identify eligible households. The programme’s unverified 
selection method has been criticized on the grounds that its highly decentralized process 
could lead to selection distortions, such as patronage and leakage. 
Although documenting patronage would require more in-depth investigation, we can 
readily evaluate leakage and other targeting issues through conventional measures of 
performance. Table 1 reports some targeting indicators for Bolsa Família. To provide a 
comparison, we present the same set of indicators for Oportunidades, the Mexican CCT 
programme, which was formerly called Progresa.3  
The Mexican statistics come from the 2004 round of the ENIGH while the Brazilian 
statistics come from the 2004 round of the PNAD. Both are annual household surveys with 
national coverage.4  
The exclusion error reported in the table is the ratio of the non-beneficiary poor to the total 
poor population: it represents under-coverage. The inclusion error, which represents leakage, is 
the number of beneficiary non-poor divided by the total beneficiary population. The inclusion 
targeting rate is the ratio of the beneficiary poor to the total poor. And the exclusion targeting 
rate is the ratio of the non-beneficiary non-poor to the total non-poor population.  
The results for such measures depend upon the choice of a poverty line. For Mexico we 
used the intermediate ‘capability’ official poverty line set for 2004 at 909.71 pesos for urban 
areas and at 651.77 pesos for rural areas. For Brazil we utilized the cut-off point for programme 
eligibility in 2004, namely, R$ 100. 
TABLE 1 






Inclusion targeting  Exclusion targeting 
BOLSA FAMÍLIA (PNAD 2004)  59%  49%  41%  92% 
OPORTUNIDADES (ENIGH 2004)  70%  36%  30%  93% 
Source: Own calculations based on PNAD 2004 and ENIGH 2004. 
 
When we compare Bolsa Família to Oportunidades, we see, in the last column of Table 1, 
that they have roughly similar exclusion-targeting measures, namely, just above 90 per cent. 
Given the large scale of the programmes, these measures are remarkably high.  
However, the under-coverage rate and the inclusion targeting rate are worse in 
Oportunidades than in Bolsa Família. The ratio of non-beneficiary poor to the total poor is 70 
per cent in the former but 59 per cent in the latter. Moreover, in Bolsa Família the ratio of the 
beneficiary poor to the total poor is 41 per cent while in Oportunidades it is only 30 per cent.  International Poverty Centre  3 
 
In contrast, Bolsa Família has a higher inclusion error than Oportunidades: 49 per cent of 
all beneficiaries are non-poor in the former programme but only 36 per cent are non-poor in 
the latter.  
These contrasting outcomes demonstrate that such cash transfer programmes face a 
trade-off between extending coverage and improving efficiency in targeting. The programme 
in Mexico has more efficient targeting than that in Brazil but at the price of having fewer poor 
households covered by the programme. Indeed, it is very difficult to expand a targeted 
programme while keeping the leakage rate from rising. 
Another way of measuring targeting performance, which has been suggested by Coady et 
al.,H is to compare the cumulative distribution of the transfers to the cumulative distribution of 
all pre-transfer income. This is done by taking the ratio of the two at specific cut-off points 
along the distribution.  
If targeting is effective, this index should be higher at poorer percentiles. For instance,  
if the index were four at the 20th percentile, one could conclude that 80 per cent of transfers 
were received by the poorest 20 per cent of the population (80/20). Table 2 presents this 
targeting measure for selected percentiles. 
We also present in Table 2 the concentration index of the transfers, which serves  
as a targeting measure for the whole distribution.S The more negative this index, the  
more progressive is the programme—namely, the more the transfers are directed to the 
poorer percentiles. 
TABLE 2 
Targeting Performance of Bolsa Família, Chile Solidario and Oportunidades 
   Concentration 
Index 
Performance: ratios of transfer/percentile 
   Poorest 10%  Poorest 20%  Poorest 30%  Poorest 40% 
BOLSA FAMÍLIA (PNAD 2004)
  -58.9 3.3  2.9  2.5  2.2 
CHILE SOLIDARIO (CASEN 2003)
  -56.9 3.7  3.0  2.4  2.1 
OPORTUNIDADES (ENIGH 2004)
  -55.8 3.6  2.9  2.5  2.1 
Sources: Own calculations based on PNAD 2004, ENIGH 2004 and CASEN 2003. 
 
To establish yet another comparison of programmes, we add to Table 2 statistics on the 
Chilean CCT programme, Chile Solidario,5 which is based on its 2003 CASEN survey (row 2). 
While this programme is targeted at extremely poor households, Bolsa Família and 
Oportunidades seek to cover all poor households. The performance indices suggest that all 
three programmes are very well targeted. According to the rank reported in Coady et al.,H  
they would rank among the 10 best out of 122 programmes analysed. 
Chile Solidario and Oportunidades perform better than Bolsa Família for the 10 per cent 
poorest of the population (with ratios of 3.6-3.7 versus 3.3). However, Bolsa Família is similar  
to the other two programmes from the 20th percentile through the 40th percentile. 
The concentration indices rank Bolsa Família as the best performer when the entire 
distribution of the transfers is considered. The reason is that it has lower leakage at the higher 
percentiles (see Soares et al.)S. For the Brazilian programme, this index is -58.9 while for the 
other two it is -56.9 and -55.8. Nevertheless, we cannot generalize these targeting results since 
the incidence curves of the three programmes cross one another. That is, our conclusions 
depend on the poverty cut-off that we use in our analysis. 4  Evaluation Note  nº  1 
3  THE IMPACT ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY 
Because of the progressive impact of cash transfers on the distribution of total income, they have 
had a notable impact on reducing inequality—even though they have not been designed to do 
so. In addition, this impact has poverty implications since in middle-income countries, poverty is 
more responsive to changes in inequality than changes in average income. 
Soares et al.R document that the Brazilian Gini index fell by 4.7 per cent from 1995 to 2004. 
Bolsa Família was responsible for 21 per cent of this fall. Since the transfers represented a mere 
0.5 per cent of total Brazilian household income, it is impressive that Bolsa Família was the 
second most important factor—after labour earnings—in driving down inequality. 
Oportunidades had a similar impact on Mexican inequality, being responsible for 21 per cent of 
the overall five per cent fall of the Mexican Gini index between 1996 and 2004.S 
Cash transfer programmes have also had a significant impact on poverty, particularly 
extreme poverty. For the poorest five per cent of the population, such as in Brazil and Mexico, 
the transfers can represent 10 per cent or more of their total income. Thus, bottom-sensitive 
measures of poverty reveal a bigger impact than the headcount ratio. For example, in Brazil, 
the poverty gap measure shows that Bolsa Família was responsible for a 12 per cent reduction 
in poverty while the poverty severity measure shows that it produced a 19 per cent reduction.T 
4  THE BASELINE IMPACT EVALUATION OF BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
The findings summarized in this section have been presented in Cedeplar’s Baseline Report on 
the Impact Evaluation of Bolsa Família.N The Report is based on the AIBF (Avaliação de Impacto 
do Bolsa Família), a nationally and regionally representative sample survey carried out by 
Cedeplar and commissioned by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) in 2005. 
The Report gauges the impacts of the programme on some key aspects of household 
behaviour, namely:6 i) aggregate consumption and its composition; ii) education outcomes;  
iii) health care;  iv) nutrition; and v) labour force participation. Since the Report uses only a 
baseline evaluation, which compares the variables of interest within a cross-sectional 
estimation framework, the results that it describes should be treated cautiously. 
The impact evaluations were carried out by using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
techniques, which seek to measure the average difference between households receiving 
Bolsa Família and similar households who do not. The similarity of the two groups is 
determined by the probability of being ‘treated’, i.e., of being selected to receive the CCT. The 
comparison group did not receive any cash transfers and had per capita income below R$ 100, 
which was the eligibility cut-off point in 2005. 
4.1  CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE 
The evaluation found that Bolsa Família has not significantly affected the aggregate level 
of household consumption.N This impact is similar to the result found for Ecuador’s Bono 
SolidarioQ, but contrasts with those for Mexico’s OportunidadesK and Colombia’s Familias 
en Acción.A International Poverty Centre  5 
 
Nevertheless, Bolsa Família has affected expenditures on food, education and child 
clothing, and consequently on the income shares spent on these items. The monthly 
expenditures on these items increased R$ 23.18, R$ 2.65 and R$ 1.34, respectively, in 
beneficiary households. In contrast, monthly expenditures on adult health and clothing were 
reduced by R$ 6.80 and R$ 0.74, respectively.N 
The impact on child clothing is similar to impacts recorded in MexicoK and Colombia,A and 
is related to the perception of beneficiary families that the transfer was a bonus that should be 
spent in the best interests of their children. This same reasoning also helps explain the increase 
in household expenditures on education. However, the evaluation found that there was no 
significant impact on the consumption of other important items, even on hygiene and child 
health,N despite conditionalities on health check-ups.  
4.2  EDUCATION 
Bolsa Família has had a clear positive impact on school attendance. The probability of absence 
in the most recent month before the survey is 3.6 percentage points lower for children in the 
programme. Also, their probability of dropping out is 1.6 percentage points lower than that of 
children in non-treated households.M Similarly, the Mexican Oportunidades has contributed to 
an increase in school attendance and a decrease in drop-outs. It has also increased re-entry 
rates among older drop-outs.G 
However, children benefiting from Bolsa Família are almost four percentage points more 
likely than non-treated children of failing to advance in school.N In Mexico grade promotion 
improved as a result of cash transfers but achievement scores were negatively affected.F Such 
adverse impacts could be attributed to the programme’s effect on increasing the number of 
under-achieving students in school. Since such students have been out of school for a while 
(or have never attended), they are likely to have greater difficulty in catching up with those 
who have always been in school. 
4.3  HEALTH CARE: IMMUNIZATION AND CHECK-UPS 
Cedeplar’s evaluationN found no impact of Bolsa Família on child immunizations despite 
conditionalities attached to obtaining them. In contrast, the Colombian Familias en Acción has 
improved the probability of adequate vaccination for children up to two years old, and the 
probability of compliance with health check-ups for children up to four years old.B The use of 
public-health services for immunizations and nutrition monitoring has also been greater in the 
Mexican villages covered by the CCT programme.J In Chile, visits to health centres by children 
younger than six years old have increased in rural areas due to Chile Solidario.I 
Since Bolsa Família has purportedly created greater awareness about the need to access 
public-health services and obtain child immunizations, the absence of impact suggests that 
supply-side impediments could have been an important constraint. Namely, the lack of health 
services available to beneficiaries have probably been a contributing factor. Nevertheless, this 
aspect was not controlled for in the evaluation. 
4.4  NUTRITION 
The AIBF collected anthropometric data in order to evaluate the impact of Bolsa Família on 
chronic malnutrition (stunting) and acute malnutrition (wasting). Stunting is measured by the 6  Evaluation Note  nº  1 
lack of height-for-age, and wasting by the lack of body mass for height and age. Unfortunately, 
the results of the impact evaluation have not yet been made public.  
The only available results are from the so-called ‘Chamada Nutricional’ (Nutritional Call), 
an evaluation survey conducted by MDS in health centres of Semi-Arid regions.P This 
evaluation showed a significant impact of Bolsa Família on the reduction of stunting for 
children aged 6-11 months, and the reduction of wasting for children up to five months old.  
However, the programme has failed to have an impact on children aged 12-36 
months. This is the critical age for nutritional vulnerability because of children’s increasing 
demand for nutrients.L The lack of impact might be related to the failure to monitor 
children’s growth through regular visits to health centre even though such visits are a 
conditionality of the programme. As in the case of immunizations, the underlying problem 
is likely to be a lack of health services rather than an unwillingness of households to send 
their children for check-ups. 
A cautionary note on the nutrition results is that the Chamada Nutricional was based on a 
self-selected sample of children who attended a health centre on a national vaccination day.7 
The authors did not adopt any technique for correcting this treatment selectivity, and did not 
control for the initial nutritional condition of children in their analysis. Thus, these evaluation 
results could well be biased. 
In Mexico the CCT programme did have significant positive impacts on the height of 
children who were 12-36 months old.E However, it is not clear whether this positive impact was 
due to the nutritional supplements given by the programme or to the cash transfers.  
By comparison, Colombia’s Familias en Acción did have a positive impact on both height 
and weight of children up to two years old without offering food supplements.B This result 
could be linked to the impact of increasing household visits to health centres to enable 
monitoring of children’s growth and the provision of advice to parents on how to prevent 
malnutrition of their children. 
4.5  LABOUR FORCE 
Critics of Bolsa Família allege that it has a negative impact on labour force participation. 
However, the evaluationN found that the labour market participation rate of treated adults was, 
in fact, 2.6 percentage points higher than for non-treated adults. This impact was gendered: 
the participation rate of beneficiary women was 4.3 percentage points higher. 
Notwithstanding such beneficial impacts, it is not possible to confirm whether treated 
adults’ higher labour force participation has been accompanied by an increasing participation 
rate for children. Even though there was a section in the major MDS publicationN that was 
addressed to child labour, it presented no specific results on this outcome. 
The reported impacts of CCTs on labour force participation vary across countries, but 
overall they do not show a negative impact. This is an important result. The Colombian 
Familias en AcciónD and the Mexican OportunidadesO have had no impact on adults’ labour 
force participation. Chile Solidario has had a positive and significant effect on labour force 
participation in rural areas.I 
While Familias en AcciónC has had no impact on adults’ participation, it has slightly 
diminished the participation of children 10-13 years old, and has had an even more International Poverty Centre  7 
 
pronounced effect on reducing their participation in domestic work. In Mexico, the CCT 
programme has contributed to a significant reduction of the proportion of children engaged 
in any kind of labour.o 
5  CONCLUSION 
Bolsa Família and other major CCT programmes in Latin America, such as those in Chile and 
Mexico, have had an impressive targeting performance, even though they have adopted 
different targeting methods. However, these programmes should implement constant 
monitoring of targeting performance in order to minimize the exclusion of potential 
beneficiaries, particularly the extremely poor. For example, in all countries with CCT 
programmes a substantial proportion of eligible households—e.g., about 60 per cent in Brazil 
and 70 per cent in Mexico—are not reached. 
An important point is that targeting effectiveness, together with the large size of the 
programme, has allowed Bolsa Família, as well as Oportunidades, to help diminish income 
inequality in a substantial and very cost-effective way even though such an impact was not a 
programme objective. These programmes have also had a noteworthy impact on reducing 
poverty, particularly extreme poverty. Among extremely poor households, transfers represent 
a sizeable proportion of their total income. 
While Bolsa Família has not had a noticeable impact on aggregate consumption, it has 
affected the share of the total household budget spent on certain important items. 
Expenditures on food, education and child clothing have increased, for instance. The increase 
in food consumption might have been able to improve child nutrition. Nevertheless, that 
increase has not necessarily implied improvements in child or adult nutrition because such an 
outcome also depends on the quality of the household diet and on preventive measures taken 
against underfeeding as a result of monitoring by health personnel. 
Bolsa Família has been effective in both increasing school attendance and decreasing 
drop-out rates, as have other CCTs. However, the decrease in drop-outs has had an 
unfortunate side-effect: it has led to more children falling behind in school. Such findings 
confirm that the programme, as a demand-side intervention, is not able, on its own, to have a 
positive impact on some education outcomes.  
Namely, it would not necessarily enable disadvantaged children to break the 
intergenerational transmission of poverty if educational policies did not concomitantly 
improve the performance of such children while in school. This problem underscores the need 
to improve educational quality or provide special attention for under-achieving children.  
The Nutritional Call Survey has shown positive impacts on reducing wasting and stunting 
in infants, but it has not shown significant effects on children 1-3 years old, who are often 
especially vulnerable. Nonetheless, these results could be plagued by selectivity bias since the 
survey took place in health centres instead of randomly in households.  
The AIBF survey has revealed that a substantial number of poor children (23-25 per cent) 
either have not had or have failed to show their vaccination cards. That is, they have probably 
not attended health centres. In addition, beneficiary children are no more likely than non-
beneficiary children to have their vaccination card updated. This might point to a supply-side 
problem arising from a lack of coverage of health service among the poorer population. 8  Evaluation Note  nº  1 
Bolsa Família has had a positive impact on adult labour force participation, with this 
impact being greater for women. Therefore, receiving cash transfers does not appear to lead 
people to drop out of the labour force, as some critics have contended.  
However, it would also be important to investigate what has happened to child labour. 
We need to determine whether the cash transfer and the school-attendance conditionality 
succeeded in taking children out of work, or whether children continued to combine both 
school attendance and work activities.  
The Brazilian Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour (PETI), which was recently 
incorporated into Bolsa Família, has addressed this problem by including an extra shift in 
school (jornada ampliada). This has not only helped the school performance of beneficiary 
children but has also constrained them from spending such time at work. 
Some of the explanations offered here for the impact of the Brazilian programme cannot 
be explored further without access to the microdata of the AIBF. The release of the primary 
data generated by the AIBF survey would enable researchers to examine more closely some of 
these preliminary findings in order to establish clearer causal relations between outcomes and 
programme efforts. The release of data has had such a beneficial effect, for example, in 
Progresa/Oportunidades. Moreover, the follow-up survey of the impact evaluation will be 
critical in assessing the robustness of the preliminary results that we report here. 
 International Poverty Centre  9 
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NOTES 
 
1. The amounts of the transfers were defined when Bolsa Família was created in January 2004. The income 
thresholds for eligibility were adjusted in April 2006. All those values were still effective when this Evaluation Note 
was written. Figures in US$ were calculated using an estimated average exchange rate of R$1.83 to one US$ for the 
period between September and November of 2007. 
2. In fact, the application form (Cadastro Único form) gathers some information on consumption that is used to 
cross-check reported income. The operational rule of thumb is that when consumption is 20 per cent higher than 
reported income, the income information should be double-checked. 
3. Since Oportunidades is an extension of Progresa, we will always refer to both as Oportunidades, even if the data 
presented refer to Progresa. 
4. In order to make the Mexican data comparable to the Brazilian, we took account of only the monetary value of 
earned in-kind items in computing household income; see Soares et al.S for more details on data and methodology. 
5. In the CASEN 2003, the Chilean household survey, the income definition was also adapted to make it comparable 
to the definitions of PNAD 2004 and ENIGH 2004. See Soares et al.S for more details on data and methodology.  
6. The Cedeplar Report does not provide information on the impact on child nutrition. However, some relevant 
information can be obtained from the analysis of the results of a survey of beneficiary and non-beneficiary children 
in the semi-arid region.P This report is also discussed here. 
7. Chamada Nutricional assumes that almost 100 per cent of children usually attend health centres in order to be 
immunized. However, according to the AIBF, 23-25 per cent of the children in its sample either did not have the 
vaccination card or failed to show it when asked to do so.N International Poverty Centre
SBS – Ed. BNDES,10o  andar
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